Mohammed Dolley v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-28-2011 
Mohammed Dolley v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Mohammed Dolley v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 770. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/770 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                     
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1804 
_____________ 
 
MOHAMMED ABDOULAYEE DOLLEY,  
                                   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                    Respondent                         
_____________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA No.A089-190-416) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
_____________                         
 
Argued July 12, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 28, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
Sarah L. Cave. Esq. 
Michael Tiger, Esq.     [ARGUED] 
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed 
One Battery Park Plaza 
New York, NY  10004 
    Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Jacob A. Bashyrov, Esq. 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
John J. W. Inkeles, Esq.     [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
2 
 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
    Counsel for Respondent 
                     
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Mohammed Abdoulayee Dolley seeks review of a final order of 
removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).  
He contends that the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), whose decision the BIA affirmed without 
opinion, erred in denying his application for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding 
of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 241(b)(3), and for relief under the Convention Against 
Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c).  We will deny his Petition. 
I. 
 We write solely for the benefit of the parties and presume their familiarity with the 
factual context and procedural history of this case.  Dolley, a Liberian national, returned 
to his hometown of Ganta City in September 2006, having previously fled to neighboring 
Guinea in 2003 to escape a decades-long civil war that was motivated in part by 
animosity between the Mandingo and Mano ethnic groups.  Upon his return, Dolley, a 
Mandingo, discovered that his family‟s land had been occupied by several Mano, and his 
family‟s home had been destroyed and replaced with temporary settlements.  Dolley 
testified that unspecified Manos on the street and Mano squatters on his land threatened 
and taunted him and other Mandingos. 
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 At the same time, the Liberian government established a Land Reform 
Commission to address the frequent land disputes between Mandingos and Manos.  This 
Commission visited Ganta City in late 2007, and Dolley sought to reclaim his land and 
presented the Commission with a copy of the deed to his land, which he had obtained 
from his mother in Guinea.  The Commission ordered that no construction should occur 
on the disputed land while it resolved the claim.  In spite of the order, a Mano named 
William Jalla began constructing a permanent structure on Dolley‟s land in March 2008, 
and refused to halt construction after Dolley confronted his contractor with the 
Commission‟s order.  Dolley and several Mandingos then destroyed the structure.  Jalla 
pressed charges against Dolley for the destruction, but a magistrate judge released Dolley 
on bond.  A week later, several Mano approached Dolley‟s girlfriend and told her they 
were going to kill him, and five men came to Dolley‟s temporary home the same night, 
called him a criminal, and chased him when he attempted to escape.   
Dolley fled to his cousin‟s house in Monrovia, the national capital, and resided 
there from March to September 2008.  During that time, Dolley visited a Monrovia 
market frequented by travelers from Ganta, where he encountered Jalla.  Jalla assaulted 
Dolley and threatened to kill him, and Dolley fled to a police station.  As a result of this 
incident, Dolley‟s cousin procured a United States lawful permanent resident card and 
Liberian passport for Dolley in the name of another individual, and Dolley flew to New 
York, where he was detained. 
At his hearing, Dolley presented his birth certificate, which his cousin had 
procured for him while Dolley was in detention, to corroborate his identity, but offered 
4 
 
no other corroboration for his testimony.  After a two-day merits hearing, the IJ found 
Dolley credible, but denied his claims for relief on grounds that he had failed to 
corroborate his claims and did not provide an explanation for his failure to do so.  The IJ 
next observed that Dolley had failed to demonstrate past persecution based on the two 
incidents in which Dolley was directly threatened, holding that Dolley‟s fear of harm was 
grounded in a personal dispute related to property rights.  The IJ found the remainder of 
Dolley‟s claims of persecution insufficiently substantial or imminent to constitute past 
persecution or to serve as a basis for a finding of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.  The IJ also determined that Dolley‟s fear of persecution was not country-
wide as he had not established that the Liberian government was unable or unwilling to 
protect him or an inability to reasonably relocate to another part of Liberia. 
The IJ likewise denied Dolley‟s request for relief under the more stringent 
requirements for withholding of removal and the Convention Against Torture in light of 
his inability to prove that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution or torture 
if removed to Liberia.  The BIA affirmed without opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(e)(4). 
II. 
 Because the Board summarily affirmed and adopted the IJ‟s decision, we review 
the latter decision.  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003).  The IJ‟s 
credibility determinations and findings of fact are evaluated under the substantial 
evidence standard, and we “will not disturb the IJ‟s [findings] if they are supported by 
reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Id. 
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(citation & quotations omitted).  “Under this deferential standard, the IJ‟s finding must be 
upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  
Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation & quotations omitted). 
 As a general principle, an asylum applicant possesses the burden of demonstrating 
his entitlement to relief as a “refugee” by establishing that he is “„unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, [his 
country of nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.‟”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).  To establish past or future persecution, “an applicant must 
„show past or potential harm rising to the level of persecution on account of a statutorily 
enumerated ground that is committed by the government or by forces the government is 
unable or unwilling to control.‟”  Kibinda, 477 F.3d at 119 (citation omitted). 
Dolley avers that his testimony of physical mistreatment and economic deprivation 
satisfied this threshold for a finding of past persecution, and contends that the IJ 
improperly required corroboration of relevant facts despite finding Dolley credible.  We 
disagree.  Under the governing statute, “[w]here the trier of fact determines that the 
applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such 
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot 
reasonably obtain the evidence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).  Corroboration may 
reasonably be expected where “the facts are central to the applicant‟s claim and easily 
subject to verification,” and we defer to the trier of fact‟s “conclusive” findings on 
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availability of corroborating evidence unless we find “that a reasonable trier of fact is 
compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”  Id. 
§§ 1252(b)(4)(B), (D)).  We have consistently held that “failure to produce corroborating 
evidence may undermine an applicant‟s case where (1) the IJ identifies facts for which it 
is reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to 
corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to adequately explain that failure.”  Chukwu v. 
Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 
554 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
 Here, the IJ engaged in the Abdulai inquiry, identifying the facts for which the 
expectation of corroboration was reasonable – evidence pertaining to the land ownership 
dispute – and discussed Dolley‟s failure to corroborate said facts.  Furthermore, under 
Abdulai‟s third prong, the IJ provided Dolley ample opportunity at the hearing to explain 
his failure to obtain the corroborating evidence, expressly inquiring why Dolley had not 
attempted to acquire corroboration of his deed and noting that the lack of corroboration – 
or sufficient explanation as to its absence – undermined Dolley‟s request for asylum.  
This factual finding is supported by substantial evidence as “[t]here is nothing in the 
record to suggest that a „reasonable trier of fact‟ would be „compelled to conclude that 
corroborating evidence is unavailable.”  Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we find no error 
in the IJ‟s ruling in this regard.1 
                                              
1
 Because the IJ properly performed Abdulai‟s three-step inquiry, she was not required 
to provide notice of the corroboration she expected or to continue the hearing so that 
Dolley could obtain such evidence.  Dolley conceded the centrality of the land deed to his 
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As mentioned, threats rising to the level of persecution “must be on account of a 
statutorily protected ground,” and “we have refused to extend asylum protection for 
threats that, while sinister and credible in nature, were not highly imminent or concrete or 
failed to result in any physical violence or harm to the alien.”  Chavarria v. Gonzales, 
446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  Here, the several threats by various 
Mano towards Dolley upon his return to Ganta City were “sinister and credible,” and may 
have been based on Dolley‟s Mandingo status.  These general threats, however, were 
directed at all returning Mandingos, were “not highly imminent or concrete,” and 
notably, did not result in any physical violence or harm until Dolley proactively 
destroyed Jalla‟s construction.  See id.  As such, we find no error in the IJ‟s rejection of 
Dolley‟s claim that these threats rose to the level of persecution. 
At the same time, Dolley testified to two incidents in which, he urges, he was 
directly in danger:  (1) when he was threatened and chased by Jalla and other Mano at his 
home, and (2) when he unexpectedly met and was assaulted by Jalla in a Monrovia 
market.  The IJ concluded that this asserted mistreatment related to a personal dispute 
and, therefore, did not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground.  
“[A]sylum may not be granted if a protected ground is only an „incidental, tangential, or 
superficial‟ reason for persecution of an asylum applicant,” and “factually intertwined 
                                                                                                                                                  
claim and appreciated the need for corroboration, but, when asked by the IJ, he failed to 
sufficiently explain his failure to produce the deed despite his cousin‟s residence in the 
same city as the government registry office where the deed was lodged.  Under these 
circumstances, notice would have been pointless.  At the same time, a continuance was 
unwarranted since the IJ afforded Dolley an opportunity during the hearing to explain 
why he was unable to produce the corroborative evidence.  At that point, the IJ could 
properly weigh, in lieu of the absent corroborative evidence, Dolley‟s explanation in 
deciding whether he had satisfied his burden of proof. 
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explanations for persecution are irrelevant where the proximate motivation for 
mistreatment of an applicant is not a protected ground.”  Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 
F.3d 124, 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  In turn, we have opined that 
“retaliation in response to a personal dispute” does not present a sufficient nexus between 
persecution and one of the protected grounds.  Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 727 (3d 
Cir. 2003).   
Here, the apparent “proximate motivation” for Dolley‟s mistreatment was his 
destruction of Jalla‟s construction on the disputed land.  The record provides that while 
Jalla had never threatened Dolley in the five months prior to Dolley‟s destruction of 
Jalla‟s structure, only after the destruction did Jalla and a group of Manos call Dolley a 
“criminal,” and chase and assault him.  This retaliation supports the IJ‟s reasoning that 
the asserted mistreatment was “fundamentally a personal dispute,” and Dolley‟s 
Mandingo status was merely “an incidental factor in [his] persecution.”  Ndayshimiye, 
557 F.3d at 130, 132.  Accordingly, substantial evidence does not “compel” a contrary 
conclusion to the one reached by the IJ.  See Kibinda, 477 F.3d at 119.
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Moreover, for mistreatment perpetrated by private actors to rise to the level of 
persecution, “the petitioner has the burden to prove that it was conducted by forces the 
                                              
2
 Dolley‟s secondary argument that his loss of income from the disputed land 
constituted economic persecution likewise fails.  We have previously held that “the 
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage which threatens a petitioner‟s life 
or freedom” may be sufficient to constitute persecution.  Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 
168 (3d Cir. 2005).  Yet Dolley‟s tenuous – and potentially temporary – loss of income 
from the land has not deprived him of “liberty, food, housing, employment, and other 
essentials of life.”  Id.  Additionally, the Liberian government is attempting to address his 
loss through a legal process by way of the Land Commission.  As such, Dolley‟s situation 
does not reflect the “severe economic disadvantage” necessary for a finding of economic 
persecution. 
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government is unable or unwilling to control.”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 288 
(citation & quotations omitted).  Because Dolley does not allege that the Liberian 
government is persecuting him, he had to demonstrate that the government was unable or 
unwilling to protect or assist him in recovering the disputed property from a small group 
of Mano.  As the IJ determined, Dolley failed to make such a showing in light of the 
efforts undertaken by the Liberian government to remedy the ethnic disputes between the 
various groups, and the specific involvement of the Land Commission and the local 
Mano magistrate in adjudicating Dolley‟s claim.  (App‟x 16, 472-73, 479); see also 
Khilan v. Holder, 557 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[E]vidence of general problems of 
ineffectiveness and corruption do not alone require a finding that the government is 
„unable or unwilling‟ where the evidence specific to the petitioner indicates the contrary 
to be true.”).  Moreover, Dolley does not indicate that he actually reported any imminent 
threats or violence to the police, making it difficult for him to contend that the 
government was unable or unwilling to prevent persecution.  See, e.g., Aliyev v. Mukasey, 
549 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008).  As a result, we discern no error in the IJ‟s conclusion 
on this issue. 
 Finally, Dolley‟s claim of a well-founded fear of future persecution is significantly 
undermined by the fact that an applicant‟s fear of persecution must be country-wide, and, 
as the IJ found, Dolley failed to establish that he could not reasonably relocate to another 
part of Liberia unmolested.  The governing regulation provides that “[a]n applicant does 
not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by 
relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality . . . if under all the 
10 
 
circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.”  8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(b)(2)(ii).  The record supports the IJ‟s finding that Dolley encountered no threats 
and was entirely unharmed in the Liberian capital city of Monrovia until he came across 
Jalla at a market in reference to the particular land dispute.  Dolley failed to press this 
issue in his briefing before us, merely arguing that the government bore the burden since 
he had established past persecution.  Because the IJ reasonably concluded that Dolley‟s 
experience did not constitute past persecution, he retained the burden of demonstrating a 
well-founded fear of persecution throughout Liberia, which he failed to satisfy.  
Accordingly, Dolley‟s asylum claims cannot succeed. 
We will also affirm the IJ‟s denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection, 
but on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds.  Section 242(a)(1) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act provides us with jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, but 
“limits our jurisdiction to cases where a petitioner „has exhausted all administrative 
remedies available as of right . . . .‟”  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (d)(1)).  “This statutory requirement [is] intended to 
ensure that the BIA has had a full opportunity to consider a claim before it is submitted to 
a federal court, [and] requires that a petitioner „raise and exhaust his . . . remedies as to 
each claim or ground for relief if he . . . is to preserve the right of judicial review of that 
claim.‟”  Kibinda, 477 F.3d 113, 120 n.8 (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 
587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
Here, the record confirms that Dolley did not contest the IJ‟s denial of his petition 
for withholding of removal and for CAT protection in his appeal to the BIA, thereby 
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failing to raise “each claim or ground for relief” for which he presently seeks our review.  
Id.; (see also App‟x 51-80.)  This “failure to present an issue to the BIA constituted a 
failure to exhaust, thus depriving us of jurisdiction to consider it.”  Lin, 543 F.3d at 126.   
Curiously, both parties contend that the BIA‟s affirmance of the IJ‟s decision 
without opinion, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), satisfied the exhaustion requirement 
of § 242(d)(1) because, as we noted in Lin, “[w]here the BIA has issued a decision 
considering the merits of an issue, even sua sponte, [exhaustion requirements] have been 
fulfilled.”3  543 F.3d at 125.  Our holding in Lin, however, is entirely distinguishable 
from the instant procedural posture.  There, we were persuaded by the Tenth Circuit‟s 
reasoning that exhaustion may be satisfied despite a petitioner‟s failure to raise an issue 
before the BIA where the Board “„issues a full explanatory opinion or a discernible 
substantive discussion on the merits over matters not presented by the alien,‟” and 
conducts “an independent review of the record and [ ] exercise[s] its own discretion in 
determining its agreement with the reasoning and result of the IJ.”  Id. at 125-26 (quoting 
Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007)).  However, we explicitly 
differentiated cases in which “„the BIA summarily affirms the IJ decision in toto without 
                                              
3
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i) provides: 
The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the decision of the 
Service or the immigration judge, without opinion, if the Board member 
determines that the result reached in the decision under review was correct; that 
any errors in the decision under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and that  
(A) The issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board 
or federal court precedent and do not involve the application of 
precedent to a novel factual situation; or  
(B) The factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so 
substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion in 
the case. 
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further analysis of the issue,‟” or “issue[s] a one-member streamlined opinion under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).”  Id. (quoting Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1122 (agreeing to jurisdiction 
because the “BIA sufficiently considered the applicant‟s two unraised claims in its final 
order” after a thorough explanatory opinion, but emphasizing that this exhaustion 
principle should be “construed narrowly” and would not apply to a simple affirmance 
without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4))).  As such, although we did not specify 
“the precise limitations” of this exhaustion principle, our holding in Lin is a limited one. 
Here, unlike Lin, the BIA affirmed without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1, 
offering no analysis on the merits, and did not address “the issue[s] independently from 
the IJ [to] ensure [ ] that the record is adequate for our review.”  543 F.3d at 125 (citing 
Weinberger v. Salfi., 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)).  Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to 
consider Dolley‟s unexhausted withholding of removal and CAT claims. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Dolley‟s Petition for Review. 
